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UTAH SUMO/IE COURT

IN THiS SUFKifciyUi CUUKT UF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRY DUGGER, dba J & D
ENTERPRISES,
Respondent - Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL J. COX, COX CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, SALT LAKE
COUNTY TREASURER, JOSEPH A.
MOLLERUP, iMcGHIE LAND TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
CLIVE M. MAXWELL dba C. M.
MAXWELL ELECTRIC COMPANY, and
HERB TOWERS MURRAY PLUMBING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Case No. 14395

Appellants - Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involved a lien foreclosure action against
real property and a claim for wages by the defendant Dugger,
dba J & D Enterprises (hereinafter called "Dugger"), against
Cox Corporation, the owner of the property, and Paul J. Cox
as an individual (hereinafter called "Cox").

The subject
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property being located at 1342 South State Street, in the
City and County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
Other defendants claiming liens against said property
were <alsp named in said action, as follows:
1.

Clive Maxwell, for and in behalf of C. M.

Maxwell Electric Company (hereinafter called
•

"Maxwell"), in the amount of $2,342.00.
2.

Herb Towers Murray Plumbing (hereinafter

called "Towers"), in the amount of $3,172.33.
Plaintiff Duggerfs lien claim was for $33,407.93,
said sum including both of the foregoing liens.
Service Station Supply (hereinafter called "Station")
filed a separate action bearing Civil No. 215255 in the same
Court, which was consolidated with this action, but no lien
was filed.

Service Station Supply's claim of $678.98 was,

however, included in plaintiff Dugger's total lien claim
of $33,407.93.
Defendant Mollerup, the first mortgage holder, as
well as defendants Salt Lake County Treasurer and McGhie
Land Title Company were all allowed to withdraw from this
case after all parties stipulated that their claims were
prior to the claims of all of the remaining parties.
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Cox filed a Counterclaim in this action against
Dugger for physical damages caused to the subject property
for $50/000.00/ plus punitive damages in the amount of
$150/000-00.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a "personal judgment"
against Cox and in favor of Dugger, and defendants Towers,
Maxwell and Station.

The court failed to rule on Cox's

Counterclaim.
In addition to the "personal judgment" the lower
court further granted Dugger, Towers and Maxwell a lien
against the subject property and ordered the lien foreclosed and the subject property sold at Sheriff's Sale.
The lower court refused Dugger's claim for wages.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal Cox seeks reversal of the lower court's
"personal judgment" against Cox and an order declaring the
lien against the subject property void and restoring said
subject property to Cox.
In the alternative/ Cox seeks to have the judgment
amount reduced so as to conform to the evidence submitted
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at trial and to have the Counterclaim remanded to the
lower court for a new trial•

STATEMENT OF FACTS
i

.

*

%

The subject property was at all times herein mentioned leased by Cox to Dynatek Corp. (hereinafter called
"Dynatek"), pursuant to a written lease.

Commencing in

December/ 1971/ and continuing on through the 19th day of
July, 1972/ during all of which time said subject property
was leased to Dynatek, Dugger claims that he was the agent
of Cox and had authority to act for Cox with regard to the
subject property.

Dugger claims that pursuant to said

authority he performed certain services and arranged for
third parties to furnish material and services/ and in
general organized and managed the repair work being conducted during the aforesaid period at the subject property.
Dugger claims compensation for said services as an employee
or agent for wages earned during said period of $1,000.00
per month plus expenses.

In addition thereto, Dugger

claims that he should be reimbursed for any charges incurred by him which relate to the subject property during
said period of time wherein any company, person, partnership, corporation or other entity furnished materials or
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labor at the request of Dugger for the subject property.
Dugger does not claim any written contract with Cox, but
claims the arrangement was oral.
Dugger further claims that Cox failed and refused
to compensate him in the amount of $1,000.00 per month as
provided for by the alleged oral agreement and that Cox
failed and refused to reimburse him for his expenses incurred with regard to the subject property and that the
said Cox failed and refused to reimburse said Dugger for
the bills and/or charges incurred by said Dugger in the
favor of various third parties, including the other
defendants herein, with regard to furnishing services,
materials and miscellaneous supplies to the subject property and as a result of said failures Dugger did, on or
about the 19th day of July, 1972, cause to be filed
against the subject property a mechanics lien in the
amount of $33,407.93, claiming that said amount included
all other creditors1 claims for services, labor, materials
and/or supplies furnished for the benefit of the subject
property.

Dugger claims wages for six months totalling

$6,000.00, which he claimed at trial were included as
part of the lien.
In addition to the lien claimed by Dugger, additional liens were filed against the subject property by
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Maxwell for $3,042.00, the same being filed on or about
the 10th day of May, 1972, and Towers for $3,172.00, said
lien being filed on or about the 30th day of June, 1972;
both of said liens, however, were included in Duggers
total lien.
In addition to the aforesaid claims against the
subject property, Station was allowed to join the case
and make a claim for judgment against Cox in the amount
of $678.98.

Station, however, did not file a lien against

the subject property and Dugger did not file a lien in
behalf of Station.
In addition to the foregoing Dugger claims that
the subject property was substantially improved by his
efforts and that to allow Cox to take advantage of said
improvements without paying therefor would unjustly enrich
Cox.
Cox denies any agency agreement with Dugger, and
therefore claims that Dugger has no authority whatsoever
to obligate the subject property for Cox, thus making the
lien filed by Dugger invalid.
Cox further claims that the lien is invalid for
the further reason that it incorrectly described the
subject property, that it co-mingled items which cannot
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be a subject of a lien with the lien figure, and that
the amount of the lien was in excess of the actual debts
claimed to be due and owing against said property as
shown by Dugger's proof at trial.
Cox claimed damages against Dugger for filing a
lien against its property thus encumbering the subject
property and resulting in the curtailment of Cox's
borrowing power so that it could not continue with its
program of development for properties located at 2500
South State Street and properties located at Beck Street,
both said properties being owned by Cox.

Cox further

claims physical damages to property against Dugger.

The

total damages claimed by Cox is $51,750.00.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT DUGGER WAS AGENT FOR COX AND SAID COURT ERRED IN SO
FINDING.
Agency.
"Agency is ordinarily a relation created by
agreement of the parties, and as between the
principal and agent, an agency is created and
authority is actually conferred very much as
a contract is made, to the extent that the
creation results from the agreement between the
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principal and agent that such a relation shall
exist• As between the parties to the relation,
there must be a meeting of the minds in establishing the agency, and the consent of both
the principal and the agent is necessary to
create the agency, . . . the principal must
intend that the agent shall act for him, . . .
and the intention of the parties must find
expression either in words or conduct between
them." (Emphasis added)
(3 AmJur 2nd, Sec. 17, P.428)
" . . . and whether an agency has in fact been
created is to be determined by the relations
of the parties as they exist under their agreement or acts, with the question being ultimately
one of intention. The question is to be determined by the fact that one represents and is
acting for another, and not by the consideration
that it will be inconvenient or unjust if he is
not held to be the agent of such other . . . "
(Emphasis added) (3 AmJur 2nd, Sec. 21, P 430-31)
In the instant case Dugger testified that he was
neither the agent of Cox nor an employee.

(See P. 215,

lines 7 thru 11 of transcript)
Don Hall testified that Dugger and witness Curtiss
Johnson, the President of Dynatek, the lessee of the subject
property, had offices in the building located on the subject
property (P.291, lines 7-30), and that Dugger's and Johnson's
desks were side-by-side and that Dugger asked Hall to do
the work on the subject property for Dugger and Dynatek,
not Dugger and Cox.

That Hall would not do the work for

Cox because of advice from his employer, and Johnson, not
Cox, paid for Hall's work.

(See Hall's testimony, P.288,

lines 3-6)
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Consider further the testimony of other witnesses
who were creditors of Dugger and/or Dynatek that were
called by Dugger to testify for and in his behalf to the
effect that none of the said witnesses ever dealt with Cox,
nor did they expect him to pay the bill.

(See P.27, lines

27-30, P.28, lines 1-30, P.29, lines 16-22)

That some

of the creditors did not even know Cox nor did they at
the time the debt was incurred expect Cox to pay the
respective debts due them, but said creditors testified
that they expected Dynatek and/or Dugger to pay to the
debts incurred, and that Dugger was working for Dynatek.
(See P.35, lines 27-30, P.36, lines 3-6)

The creditors

further testified that Dugger never once told them who
owned said property, nor did Dugger ever charge anything
which was delivered to said property in the name of Cox.
Dugger did, however, on numerous occasions charge items in
the name of Dynatek, the owner of the leasehold interest
and Dugger also charged items in the name of J & D Enterprises and Jerry Dugger personally.

(See P.66, lines 8-11,

P.72, lines 6-10, P.80, lines 17-30, P.81, lines 1-3, P.82,
lines 19-23, P.83, lines 5-14, P.96, lines 14-25, P.107,
lines 9-17, P.112, lines 4-30, P.113, lines 1-8, P.115,
lines 2-24, P.118, line 19-23, P.125, lines 4-30, and
P.126, line 1.)
- 9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Dugger produced no evidence to show that any of
the creditors relied upon the testimony regarding agency
as related by Turner and Johnson, both interested parties,
or that the creditors ever had knowledge of said conversations and neither Johnson nor Turner were creditors.

No

evidence was introduced by Dugger that any of the creditors
relied on the testimony of Woolas A. Macey regarding the
relationship between Dugger and Cox, which Cox denied.
It would seem logical that if Dugger was in fact
Cox's agent that he would have at least once during all
of these transactions charged something in the name of
Cox, but he cannot offer one instance in which this
happened.

Neither did Dugger offer any evidence to show

that the alleged agency agreement was to be that of an
undisclosed principal or employer nature.
I would further point out that none of these creditors
ever dealt with Cox previously by and through Dugger.

Neither

had the majority of said creditors ever dealt directly with
Cox.

Therefore, it can hardly be'said that Cox had clothed

Dugger with ostensible authority to act for Cox Corporation
or Paul J. Cox by reason of past actions, thereby creating
an agency relationship.
A check introduced into evidence by defendant Cox
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from a finance company in the amount of $10,000 further
indicates that Dugger was in fact Johnson's agent, and
they were working together to purchase the first mortgage
on the subject property from one Mollerup, and in fact
Dugger and Johnson were ultimately successful in bringing
about a purchase of the first mortgage from Mollerup by
one Beesley, and immediately after the same was purchased
by Beesley the same was assigned to Zions First National
Bank and a foreclosure action was commenced to foreclose
Cox's interest out of the property.

The court can take

judicial notice of said action being filed as Civil No.
215226 in the above entitled district court.
Cox testified that he did in fact authorize certain
acts to be done by Dugger, to-wit: moving an old house,
which was not located on the subject property but on a
lot just north of said subject property, purchase doors
for the car wash, and some carpenter work.

Cox testified

that he did in fact pay Dugger for all of said work performed.
The evidence further shows that these three items are the
only items which Dugger ever billed Cox for, thus negating
the attempted inference by Dugger that he had authority to
do other acts for Cox.

Dugger failed to produce one shred

of written evidence to indicate that from January 1, 1972,
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through July 7, 1972, that he had made any demand for
payment upon Cox, except for the items just mentioned
above.

Neither did Dugger, prior to said time, ever

furnish Cox with an accounting of the bills against said
property and, in fact, no completed accounting was produced at trial, and then Dugger could not testify as
to what was owed him.

(See P.194, lines 11-17)

- 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED "A PERSONAL
JUDGMENT" AGAINST COX AND IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ON
THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Acting officiously also applies to the claim made
by Dugger that Cox was unjustly enriched by reason of the
acts of Dugger and the other Plaintiff creditors.

In 66

Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 5, p. 948, entitled "Restitution and
Implied Contracts", wherein the subject of officious acts
are discussed, the following is stated:
"A basic principal underlying the rules in regard
to restitution (funjust enrichment1) is that a
person who officiously confers a benefit upon
another is not entitled to restitution therefor.
Officiousness means interference in the affairs
of others not justified by the circumstances
under which the interference takes place. Policy
ordinarily requires that a person who has conferred a benefit either by way of giving another
services, or by adding to the value of his land,
or by paying his debt, or even by transferring
property to him should not be permitted to require the other to pay therefor, unless the one
conferring the benefit had a valid reason for so
doing. Where a person has officiously conferred
a benefit upon another, the other is enriched but
is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The
rule denying restitution to officious persons has
the effect of penalizing those who thrust benefits
upon others and protecting persons who have had
benefits thrust upon them.
One has a right to decline to permit another to
perform an act on his account. A party is not
liable quasi ex contractu for benefits forced
upon him. Where there was no request for what
the Plaintiff did, the fact that drawn out negotiations were unsuccessful because the parties
- 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In order for Dugger to collect under a theory of
restitution or unjust enrichment for wages or services
performed there must have been no agreement in the first
instance and here according to Dugger f s own testimony, he
claims that there was an oral agreement to pay, thus he
must be bound by that testimony and cannot claim a right
of recover under a theory of restitution, but must rely
upon his alleged agency relationship which did not exist.
66 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. .11, p. 952, states that:
11

. . .the doctrine of unjust enrichment or recovery in quasi contract applies to situations
where there is no legal contract but where the
person sought to be charged is in possession
of money or property which in good conscience
and justice he should not retain but should
deliver to another, the courts imposing a
duty to refund the money or the use value
of the property to the person whom in good
conscience it ought to belong."
In the instant case all creditors, including Dugger,
claimed against Cox that there was a legal and binding
contract.

Neither does Dugger or any of the other creditors

claim or plea that there was not an existing contract, thus
under the law applying to unjust enrichment they cannot
recover.
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did not agree on a price affords no basis for
imposing a quasi-contractual liability on the
Defendant in such case, the Plaintiff occupies
the position of a volunteer."
(Gould v American Water Works Service Co., 52
NJ 226, 245 A2d 14 (citing Restatement, Restitution, Sees. 2, 41, 112)). Mehl v Norton, 201
l
* Minn 203, 275 NW 843, 113 ALR 1055). (Restatement, Restitution, Sec. 2 Comment a; Section
112, Comment a ) .
In 66 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 23, entitled "Restitution
and Implied Contracts", it states as follows:
"Ordinarily the law imposes liability to pay
for services rendered by another only when
the person for whose benefit they were rendered by requested their rendition. As a general
rule, where a person performs labor for another
without the latter' s request, however beneficial
such labor may be, he cannot recover therefor.
There is no implied contract to pay for services
not requested where the person sought to be
charged made no use thereof." (Emphasis added)
(See Tilley v Cook County, 103 US 155, 27 L Ed
374.)
"The basic principal that a person who officiously
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to
restitution therefor, and the general rule that a
person who without mistake, coercion, or request
has unconditionally conferred a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution . . . "
In the instant case there was no evidence offered
by Dugger that any of the specific acts performed by him "
and testified to by him were requested to be done by Cox.
In fact, the evidence indicated just the opposite, that Cox
objected to the services being performed.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID
BECAUSE THE SAME COVERED EXCESS PROPERTY NOT BENEFITED
BY THE ALLEGED SERVICES AND MATERIALS FURNISHED BY DUGGER.
The lien filed by Dugger covered property in excess
of the property which Dugger claims to have conferred a
benefit upon by his alleged services and/or materials
which he claims to have furnished.

Dugger's Complaint,

on its face, states that the lien covered property in excess
of that which was intended, and said Complaint prays for
permission to amend said lien.

Said permission to amend

said lien was never granted nor was said lien ever amended.
Sec. 38-1-4, UCA (1953), Replacement Volume 4, states the
following:
"The liens granted by this chapter shall extend
to and cover so much of the land whereon such
building structure or improvement shall be made
as may be necessary for the continuing convenient
use and occupation thereof." (Emphasis added)
Thus Dugger is legally bound by his Complaint and
said Complaint having admitted that the lien covered excess
property and Dugger having never corrected the same, the
lien of Dugger is invalid.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
CREDITORS WERE VALID BECAUSE SAID LIENS
PURSUANT TO LAW, AND THE ERRORS IN SAID
SUPPORT COX'S CONTENTION THAT NO AGENCY
COX AND DUGGER AS PER POINT I HEREOF.

LIENS OP OTHER
WERE NOT FILED
LIENS FURTHER
EXISTED BETWEEN

Sec. 38-1-7, UCA (1953), Replacement Volume 4,
sets forth the requirement and contents of the notice
to be filed by the lien claimant and states the following:
". . .every lien shall set forth . . . the name
of the person by whom he was employed or to
whom he furnished the material with a statement of the terms, time given and conditions
of his contract, specifying the time when the
first and last labor was performed or the first
and last material was furnished, and also a
description of the property to be charged with
a lien sufficient for identification which £laim
must be verified by oath of himself or some other
person." (Emphasis added)
In the instant case# the lien of Towers shows that
he was contacted by Curtis C. Johnson of Dynatek Enterprises, Inc., the lessee of the property and under a verbal
agreement for time and materials made between the said
Curtis C. Johnson, Dynatek Enterprises, Inc., on the 9th
day of May, 1972, through the 8th 'day of June, 1972,
performed work and Johnson agreed to pay for the same.
Said lien further shows that Johnson made payments by check
drawn on bank accounts which contained insufficient funds.
The lien of Towers is void by reason of the fact that there
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was no evidence whatsoever put on by Dugger or Towers
showing that there was any agency relationship between
Curtis C. Johnson, Dynatek, and Cox, and in order to
make Towers' lien valid, Plaintiffs must, according to
Eccles Lumber Co, v Martin, 31 U 241, 87 P 713, have made
a contract with the owner of the land or his authorized
agent in order to successfully initiate a lien against the
owner's real property.

This lien being made and filed in

July of 1972 right at the time that the acts testified by
all parties was taking place clearly indicates that Dynatek
Enterprises, Inc., and Curtis C. Johnson were operating
as lessee out of the subject property, and Dugger was their
agent.

(See also Ellis v Brisacher, 8 U 108, 29 P 879,

which states that if repairs and improvements are put on
premises under contract between a contractor and a lessee
of said premises, then and in that event any liens filed
against said premises shall be against the interests of
the leasehold only.)

(See also Buehner Block Co. v Glezo,

6 U 2d 226, 310 P2d 517, which indicates that the lessee
of real property is an owner within the meaning of the
Mechanics Lien statute.
The lien filed by Maxwell is void also for the reason
as stated heretofore herein and as borne out by the facts
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that Dugger was in fact not the agent for Cox Corporation,
and said lien is further faulty by reason of the fact that
the same shows that the contract was made with J & D
Enterprises and Dynatek, and that the said J & D Enterprises and Dynatek agreed to pay the bill upon completion
of the contract.

Here again the said lien being made and

filed in May of 1972 at the time the work was being done
shows that J & D Enterprises was agent for Dynatek and not
Cox.

(Towers1 lien is marked Exhibit ID Towers; Maxwell's

lien is marked Exhibit 7D Maxwell; and Dugger1s lien is
marked as Exhibit 22P).
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE (1) THE
LIENS ARE INVALID, AND (2) INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED TO SUPPORT JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES
^ Section 38-1-18, Utah-Code Annotated 1953,

i

Replacement Volume 4, provides
"In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover reasonable attorney
fees to be fixed by the court which shall be
taxed as cost in the action."
All parties failed to put on sufficient evidence
at trial to justify an award of attorney fees.

Counsel

merely asking their clients if a certain amount to be
charged as and for attorney fees is reasonable, is not
sufficient evidence for the court to determine the value
of said fees without knowing the hours, etc. put into said
case.
Thus, based upon the evidence before the lower
court it erred in awarding attorney fees to Dugger and
the other alleged creditors under the foregoing statute.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID BECAUSE
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF SAID LIEN WAS EXCESSIVE
Section 38-1-25 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Replacement Volume 4, provides
"Any person who knowingly causes to be filed
for record a claim of lien against any property
which contains a greater demand than the sum
due him with the intent to cloud the title, or
to exact from the owner or person liable by
means of such excessive claim of lien more than
is due him or procure any advantage or benefit
whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
(Emphasis added)
In the instant case the lien filed by Dugger is
excessive as shown by the sums in Appendix A. hereto.
The excessive amount of Duggerfs lien, along with
the fact that Dugger without cause or justification liened
other properties of the defendant Cox Corporation during
the same period of time, and also made attempts to purchase or lease the subject property, certainly indicate
that his interests were adverse to the interests of Cox,
and the act of Dugger in liening the subject property for
such an excessive amount was in fact an attempt to procure
an advantage or benefit which, according to the statute, is
prohibited.
In Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co. v. Orr (Okla) 321 P2d
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373, the court held, in construing the statutes such as
the ones that we have in Utah, that a lien claim is at
most a tentative charge against property, and that, it
may be defeated by showing that the indebtedness, or a
considerable part thereof is not owing.

In the instant

case Dugger in fact admitted that a considerable part of
his lien which he claimed upon Cox's property was not due
and owing by his failure to prove the same and by his
failure to give proper credits to Cox Corporation as
provided for by the lien statute, and by his further
failure to deduct liens of others from his lien which
were filed prior to Dugger's lien, and for his further
audacity in including liens in lien without the authority
of other creditors such as Don Hall, all of which make
Dugger's lien invalid.
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POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DUGGERfS LIEN VALID BECAUSE
HE CO-MINGLED NONLIENABLE ITEMS THEREIN
51 AmJur 2nd, Section 7, P. 149 states, "a lien is
unenforceable if the notice or claim of lien mingles
lienable and non-lienable items in unsegregated form",
and 51 AmJur 2nd Sec, 15, P.154-155 states that a lien
on property may not be declared as security for a simple
money claim for services.

(See also Jaycox v. Brune [Mo]

434 SW2d 539)
51 AmJur 2nd, Section 12, P.152-153 states that
a "lien cannot be created by a mere volunteer and, as a
general rule, no lien is created as against an owner of
property in respect of expenditure upon or liabilities
incurred in respect of that property by either a stranger
or a part owner of the property."

Here again, Dugger

being a mere volunteer with regard to his acts upon the
property in hopes of obtaining something in the future
for himself cannot bind Cox.
Section 38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 4, states as follows regarding those who are
entitled to a lien:

"Contractors, subcontractors, and

all persons performing the labor upon or furnishing
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materials to be used in the construction or alteration
of, or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure
or improvement upon land . . . " are entitled to a lien.
In the instant case Dugger did not in fact perform any
labor or furnish any materials to be used in connection
with said property but merely arranged to have the same
furnished.

The law is clear that a lien may not be de-

clared as security for a simple money claim for services.
(3ee 51 AmJur 2d, Sec. 15, P. 155,' and
[Mo] 434 SW2d 539)

Jay cox v. Brune

Thus Dugger admittedly claimed to

have furnished services only and therefore he cannot lien
the property, the courts making a distinction between
labor upon the property and the mere act of furnishing
services.
Many of the items included in Dugger's lien in
addition to the wages claimed are not lienable items.
Such other items which are not lienable items are travel
expenses, cost of materials shipped to other areas and
used on property such as Richfield and Nephi (See P.106,
lines 1-30, and P.107, lines 1-30) and various other items
such as supplies and inventory purchased for resale which
were shipped to the service station and sold by Dynatek.
All of the aforesaid items are documented by the evidence
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submitted by Dugger and are detailed in Appendix B.
hereto.
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POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO MAKE
ANY RULING WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTERCLAIM OF COX.
Even though evidence was produced by Cox with regard
to hi^ Counterclaim, and everl though the same was clearly
outlined in a Brief to the Lower Court by counsel for Cox,
the Court failed and neglected to make any ruling thereon,
therefore, with regard to said Counterclaim, this case
should be remanded in total to the District Court for
further proceedings with regard to said Counterclaim's
validity.
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POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A PERSONAL JUDGMENT AND ALSO
IN DECLARING THE LIEN VALID AND CAUSING THE SAME TO BE
FORECLOSED
1

* In substance and effect the lower court let

Dugger and the other lien-claimants 'have their cake
and eat it too1 by awarding both a personal judgment and
a judgment for a decree of foreclosure allowing the liens
to be foreclosed•
lien or not.

Said creditors either have to have a

If they have a lien that is valid they

are entitled to attorney fees, and the statute provides
for a method of foreclosure of same.

If they do not

have a valid lien then they are not entitled to attorney
fees, but a judgment only.

The lower court in granting

both types of judgment allowed Dugger to encumber numerous
other properties of Cox prior to foreclosure of his lien
on the subject property, therefore giving him a decided
advantage over Cox and any other creditors.
The lien foreclosure statute does not contemplate
such an act by the lower court.

Section 38-1-15 Utah Code

Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 4b, states as follows
relating to mechanics liens:
"The court shall cause the property to be
sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs
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as in the case of foreclosure of mortgage
subject to the right of redemption. . ."
Section 38-1-16 of said Code further provides for
a deficiency after sale.
,* Section 78-37-1, Utah .Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, provides as follows:
"There can be but one action for the recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter."
Thus the lien statute refers to mortgage foreclosure statute and the mortgage foreclosure statute
provides for one action, that being a foreclosure action
and a determination of a deficiency or an overage, and
the lower court failed to follow the law with regard
to the same.
The purpose of such a provision is to compel one
who claims a security for a debt to exhaust that particular security before resorting to the general assets
of the debtor.

Such a creditor cannot waive his security

and sue on a debt.

Thus, by reason of said error, this

case in total should be remanded to the District Court
for clarification and further proceedings in accordance
with the law and the statutes as set forth herein.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Cox respectfully
requests and demands that the judgment of the lower court
be reversed, that the liens on said property be declared
void, and that this case be remanded in total to the
District Court for further proceedings in accordance
with the laws and statutes as set forth herein.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 1976.
fully

for Appellant-Defendant Cox
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